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THE THIRD WAVE: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE
AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM
Julian G. Ku*

INTRODUCTION

For a number of years, commentators have argued (and
some courts have agreed) that § 1350 of the 1789 Judiciary
Act, the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS"),1 does not authorize
federal courts to hear lawsuits by alien plaintiffs alleging
violations of international law.2 In last term's decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,3 the Supreme Court largely
rejected this challenge and preserved the federal courts'
authority to hear lawsuits claiming certain violations of
international law pursuant to the ATS. 4
Although the Sosa Court characterized its holding as
narrow and limited,' the Sosa decision is not likely to end
the controversy over ATS litigation. Indeed, there are good
reasons to believe that post-Sosa ATS lawsuits will prove
substantially more controversial than the pre-Sosa lawsuits
that led to the Sosa decision itself.
Unlike the "first wave" of ATS lawsuits that generally
involved suits by aliens against other aliens, or the "second
Associate Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. The author
would like to thank the editors of the Emory International Law Review for
organizing the symposium on the Alien Tort Statute that led to this Article.
1 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(Bork, J., concurring) (opining that the ATS does not provide a cause of action for
private plaintiffs); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International
Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV.
815 (1997); A.M. Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Cases,
20 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 38-44 (1995).
3 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
4 See id. at 2761. The Court's decision was hardly persuasive on its own
purportedly formalist terms, as John Yoo and I argue in a forthcoming article.
Julian Ku & John Yoo, BEYOND FORMALISM IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS: A FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH TO THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 153, 164-76 (2004). But
for the purposes of my discussion here, the persuasiveness of the Court's decision is
no longer at issue.
5 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2764.
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wave" of ATS lawsuits against multinational corporations
alleged to be "aiding and abetting" foreign government
violations of customary international law ("CIL"), what I
call the "third wave" of ATS lawsuits are directed at the
legality of the actions of the U.S. government itself. This
third wave has already manifested itself in lawsuits arising
out of U.S. mistreatment of prisoners held in Iraq, alleged
mistreatment of detainees held in Guantanamo Bay, and
the rendition of suspected terrorists to third countries for
interrogation. For this reason, the Sosa Court's decision to
preserve federal courts' power to recognize causes of action
under international law pursuant to the ATS has kept the
door ajar for a third wave of ATS lawsuits challenging the
U.S. government's conduct of the war on terrorism.
My goal in this Article is neither to celebrate nor to
condemn this coming wave of ATS litigation. Rather, my
more modest task is to describe examples of this new wave
of ATS litigation, challenging the U.S. government's
conduct of the war on terrorism, to explain why the Sosa
decision will not prevent this wave of litigation, and to
discuss why the coming wave of ATS litigation will
highlight the role of the executive branch in the
administration of international law in U.S. courts.
I
suggest, as a doctrinal matter, that the executive branch
has a crucial, yet largely unexplored, role to play in the
application of international law by the courts, especially
customary international law. The third wave of ATS
lawsuits will, I believe, test the importance of this role.
I.

A THIRD WAVE

OF LITIGATION UNDER THE ALIEN TORT
STATUTE

The ATS, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Sosa
and by lower federal courts, permits alien plaintiffs to bring
lawsuits in federal courts for violations of customary
international law and/or a treaty of the United States. The
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potentially broad scope of this statute has led to a number
of lawsuits, most of which allege violations of international
human rights law.'
A. The Firstand Second Waves of Alien Tort Statute Litigation
The various types of ATS lawsuits alleging violations of
international human rights can be classified into three
waves. The very first lawsuit brought under the ATS, the
7 was brought
seminal case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
against a Paraguayan government official who allegedly
violated international law proscriptions against torture in
his treatment of another Paraguayan national.
The
Filartigacase, in addition to opening the door to future ATS
lawsuits, also provided a model for the first wave of ATS
lawsuits.' Such "first wave" lawsuits shared a number of
characteristics.
For instance, first wave lawsuits were generally brought
against foreign government officials acting under the color
of foreign law.
Such officials might have been, as in
Filartiga, relatively low-level government officials who
could not seek the protection of foreign sovereign
immunity.9 Other higher level officials, who appeared to
qualify for sovereign immunity, were nonetheless exposed
to liability for their actions because of questions about the
status of the government actor in question. Thus, in Kadic
v. Karadzic,1 ° head of state immunity was not recognized
6

The vast majority of ATS cases have alleged violations of international human

rights law, but there are exceptions. See, e.g., Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess,
488 U.S. 428 (1989) (alleging violation of CIL in Argentine plane's attack on neutral
ship during Falklands Island War).
630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
8 Dean Koh has gone so far as to call Filartiga the "Brown v. Board of
Education" of the international human rights movement. Harold Hongju Koh,
TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 100 YALE L.J. 2347, 2366 (1991).
' For instance, in Filartiga,the defendants were former low-level government
officials. Id. at 2367.
10 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995).
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where the defendant's State, the Serbian Republic of
Bosnia, was not recognized by the United States.1' For
obvious reasons, however, foreign sovereigns whom had
been recognized by the U.S. government generally have
been held immune from ATS lawsuits, despite efforts to
argue that such immunity was "waived" in the context of
serious violations of basic fundamental human rights
protections12
For this reason, the classic ATS lawsuit during the first
decade after Filartigainvolved claims by alien plaintiffs
against alien individual defendants.13
Such defendants
often failed to defend these claims and courts often entered
default judgments. Such judgments were rarely collected,
but defendants who had judgments entered against them
could not live or visit the United States without the danger
of having their assets attached.
Although this first wave of ATS lawsuits generated some
criticism in the legal academy on the ground that the ATS
did not actually authorize such lawsuits, they did not
appear to cause serious foreign policy concerns that drew
the serious attention of either the executive or legislative
branches."
Indeed, the U.S. government sometimes cited
such lawsuits as a demonstration of its commitment to the
enforcement of international human rights laws. Moreover,
only a few such lawsuits were filed. 5

" Id. at 248.
12 See, e.g., Princz

v. Federal Republic of Germany, 26 F.3d 1166 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995); Trajano v. Marcos, 878
F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988);
Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276 (S.D. Cal. 1986).
'4
The executive branch's support for the use of ATS lawsuits varied from
administration to administration. Compare Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae, Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995) (Nos. 94-9035, 94-9069), with
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th
Cir. 1989) (No. 86-2448). Despite the changing positions, the Marcos brief did not
actually challenge the ATS in general. Rather, it opposed the use of the ATS in the
particular case at hand.
15 Between 1980 and 1990, only thirty-one such lawsuits were filed based on a
3
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Beginning in the mid-1990s, however, the breadth and
frequency of ATS lawsuits increased dramatically when
alien plaintiffs began suing U.S. and foreign corporations
under the ATS. s Because the general rule of international
law applies its prohibitions to governments, such lawsuits
proceeded on the theory that corporations "aided and
abetted" foreign governments in their violation of
international human rights law.
Doe v. Unocal Corp.7 is the classic example of the "second
wave" of ATS litigation. Doe, representing a class of
Burmese nationals, sued Unocal for allegedly supporting
and, in some cases, directly participating in the violation of
international human rights law during the construction of
Although the government of Burma
an oil pipeline."
allegedly committed the violations of international law,
Unocal would be liable on the theory that its activities
"aided and abetted" the Burmese government's abuses.
Because Burma enjoyed foreign sovereign immunity, only
Unocal was actually sued. 9
Not surprisingly, U.S. and foreign corporations proved
more attractive defendants than foreign government
officials, primarily because corporations had substantial
assets within the jurisdiction of U.S. federal courts.
Corporations found themselves sued, or facing threat of
suit, for a variety of alleged international human rights
abuses.2"

search of Westlaw's "ALLCASES" database using the search terms ("alien tort
statute" or "alien tort claims act" and da(after 1980 and before 1991)).
16 Between 1990 and 2000, seventy-nine such lawsuits were filed based on a
search of Westlaw's "ALLCASES" database using the search terms ("alien tort
statute" or "alien tort claims act" and da(after 1980 and before 1991)).
17 27 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
18 Id. at 1178-80.
19

Id.; GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & NICHOLAS K. MITROKOSTAS, AWAKENING

MONSTER: THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE OF 1789, 9 (Institute for International
Economics 2003).
20 One recent study has suggested that the threat of such lawsuits may deter
billions of dollars of foreign investment in developing countries. Id. at 1.
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Unlike first wave ATS defendants, second wave ATS
defendants could and did defend themselves in court.
Drawing upon some of the arguments developed by
academic critics of the ATS, corporations facing ATS
lawsuits sought a judicial determination that the ATS did
not actually authorize such lawsuits. Although Sosa did
not involve a corporate defendant, the corporate defense bar
was actively involved in the case both at the appellate level
and before the Supreme Court."' Additionally, foreign
governments, whose conduct was implicitly being
challenged by such lawsuits, began to file official and
unofficial protests against such lawsuits."
B. The Third Wave

As the corporate bar, with increasing support from the
U.S. government, began challenging the use of the ATS,
alien plaintiffs found a new source of possible human rights
abuses-the U.S. government itself. After the attacks of
September 11, 2001, the U.S. government launched a wide
variety of military activities, including the detention of
thousands of aliens captured in Afghanistan, and later Iraq,
as well as in third party countries.
Three of the most controversial elements of the U.S. war
on terror arose from the detention of aliens suspected of
terrorist activities in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, the
treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war at the Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq, and the "rendition" of aliens to third party
countries. International human rights groups and foreign
governments charged the U.S. military with violating
international human rights and laws of war obligations in
the detention and interrogation of these foreign nationals.23
2

See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae in support of Petitioner by National Association

of Manufacturers, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004).
22 See, e.g., Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2766 n.21 (describing protest by government of
South Africa).
23

See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, GETTING TO GROUND TRUTH: Investigating
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Thus, in 2004, alien plaintiffs began filing lawsuits directly
challenging the conduct of U.S. government officials,
particularly military officials, in the administration of
Guantanamo Bay and portions of Iraq, as well as in the
rendition of aliens to third party countries.
Three recently filed lawsuits illustrate the potential of
third wave ATS lawsuits to challenge these policies of the
U.S. government. In Rasul v. Bush,24 four U.K. nationals,
who had been detained by the United States at
Guantanamo Bay, filed a claim under the ATS against the
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, and various other U.S. military and government
officials. 25
The U.K. nationals alleged that they were
systematically tortured by U.S. military and civilian
personnel in violation of their rights under the U.S.
Constitution, federal laws, international treaties, and CIL.28
The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia, claims jurisdiction under the general federal
question statute and the ATS seeks $10 million in
damages .27
Second, in Saleh v. Titan,2 detainees at the notorious Abu
Ghraib prison in Iraq sued the Titan Corporation and other
military contractors hired by the U.S. government to
support occupation operations in Iraq. 29 The plaintiffs, ten
Iraqi nationals formerly detained at Abu Ghraib, allege
that Titan knowingly participated in alleged torture and
other forms of abuse. The lawsuit, filed in the U.S. District
U.S. Abuses in the "War on Terror," available at http-J/www.humanrightsfirst.org/us
JawPDF/detainees/GettingtoGround Truth_090804.pdf (2004).
" Rasul v. Rumsfeld (complaint available at http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/
september2 lth/sept lArticle.asp?ObjID=1VSkOOGX7D&Content=455).
25 Ex-Guantanamo Inmates File Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2004, at A10.
26 id.
27 id.
28 2004 WL 3104662.
29 Terri Somers, Lawsuit Ties Titan to Abuse at Iraq Prison, SAN DIEGO TRIB.,
July 2, 2004, availableat http://www.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20040702/news
lb2titan.html.
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Court in the Southern District of California, claims
violations of the U.S Constitution and RICO, as well as
treaties and CIL pursuant to the ATS.3 °
Third, in Arar v. Ashcroft,3 a Canadian national sued the
U.S. Attorney General, the Secretary of Homeland Security,
and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
along with several officials, for their involvement in his
rendition to Syria, where he allegedly suffered torture and
other abuse at the hands of Syrian interrogators for
weeks.32 The U.S. officials allegedly detained Arar in
violation of his constitutional right to due process and then
rendered him to Syrian authorities knowing that he would
be subject to torture and other abuse in violation of federal
laws prohibiting torture.33 The lawsuit, filed in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York, claims
jurisdiction under general federal question and also under
the Torture Victim Protection Act.
Interestingly, the
Plaintiff could also have claimed jurisdiction under the ATS
but chose, probably for strategic reasons, not to do so. Still,
the practice of renditions is highly controversial, and it is
likely that future plaintiffs will sue for damages arising out
of such renditions pursuant to the ATS.
All of these lawsuits reflect a shift in focus for ATS
litigation. Whereas previous ATS lawsuits alleged an
underlying violation of international law by a foreign
government, the ATS terrorism lawsuits represent the first
time that the U.S. government's conduct itself has been the
basis for ATS litigation. Moreover, while many of the
complaints allege violations of U.S. constitutional law, the
plaintiffs' right to seek U.S. constitutional protections is
30 Id.

Arar v. Ashcroft, No 04-CV-0249-DGT-VVP (E.D.N.Y.) (documents available at
http'//www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september llth/septllArticle.asp?ObjID=zPvu7s2XV
3'

J&Content=377).
32 Tim Harper, Arar deportation 'within law.-Ashcroft, TORONTO SUN, NoV. 21,

2003.
33 id.
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uncertain given their status as aliens.34 In contrast, their
ATS claims, brought under CIL and treaty law, suffer from
no such difficulties. 5
While the U.S. government has pledged that it will abide
by international treaties and federal statutes prohibiting
conduct such as torture, Guantanamo, Abu Ghraib, and
renditions will hardly be the only controversial aspects of
the U.S. government's conduct of the war on terrorism.
Freedom of Information Act lawsuits have suggested that
there is evidence of broader violations of international
human rights law than previously suspected.36 Moreover,
information has surfaced suggesting that the U.S. military's
conduct in Afghanistan also may have violated
international human rights law.3
The re-election of President George W. Bush, after a
campaign based largely on his commitment to the
continuing war on terrorism,38 suggests that the U.S.
31 See, e.g., United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).

" It is likely that the U.S. government retains sovereign immunity for its
actions, but it is quite likely that U.S. government officials and, to an even greater
degree, its military contractors will not be able to avail themselves of the same
protections. Suits against U.S. government officials may avoid sovereign immunity
on the theory that federal officials were either acting outside the scope of their
authority, or that they were acting in violation of clearly established statutory or
treaty violations that a reasonable person could have believed. 14 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3655 (3d ed.

2004).

36 Kate Zernike, Newly Released Reports Show Early Concern on Prison
Abuse,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2005, at Al, available at httpJ/www.freerepublic.com/focus/fnews/1314999/posts.
37 Angie C. Marek & Edward T. Pound, A Lingering Prison Scandal, U.S. NEWS

& WORLD REP., Jan. 10, 2005, at 30-31.
3 President Bush laid out his approach in his famous September 20, 2001
speech.
"Our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated
strikes. Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign
unlike any other we have ever seen. It may include dramatic strikes visible
on TV and covert operations secret even in success. We will starve
terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place
to place until there is no refuge or no rest. And we will pursue nations that
provide aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation in every region now
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government's aggressive and controversial policies will
continue. Certainly, Bush's nomination of Alberto Gonzales
as the Attorney General for his second term suggests he
will not back away from his aggressive tactics. Gonzales is
widely regarded as a key legal architect behind many of the
policies now being challenged in the ATS suits.39
In sum, there is every reason to believe that a third wave
of ATS litigation is emerging. Unlike the two previous
waves of litigation, however, the underlying conduct being
challenged is that of the U.S. government and its officials.
II. SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN

AND THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE

This section considers the impact of the Supreme Court's
decision in Sosa on the coming third wave of ATS litigation.
A. Sosa and the Challenge to the ATS
The Supreme Court in Sosa considered the question of
whether the ATS served merely to create jurisdiction in the
federal courts for violations of CIL and treaties or whether
it also created a cause of action for alien plaintiffs. The text
of the ATS, which was drafted in 1789 as part of the
has a decision to make: Either you are with us or you are with the
terrorists. From this day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or
support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile
regime."
President George W. Bush, Address to a joint session of Congress (Sept. 20, 2001),
available at http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/20/gen.bush.transcript.
Bush's second inaugural address suggests, if anything, a more aggressive
foreign policy: "So it is the policy of the United States to seek and support the
growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with
the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." President George W. Bush,
Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at http'//www.whitehouse.
gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html.
39 See, e.g., Michael Isikoff, Unanswered Questions: Alberto Gonzales will
likely
be confirmed. But that won't stop the widening scandal over Gitmo detainees,
NEWSWEEK, Jan. 17, 2005, at 36.
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Judiciary Act, has been the subject of substantial
argument, both in the courts and in the legal academy. It
reads, in its current form:
The district courts [of the United States] shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States .
In Sosa, the Court considered, and in some ways accepted,
the main argument raised by the critics of the ATS, who
claimed that the ATS was best read to create only
jurisdiction for federal courts." The Court did not, however,
accept the next step in the critics' analysis, which would
have held that Congress was required to subsequently
create a specific cause of action to support any lawsuit
claiming a violation of the law of nations.
Instead, the Court held that, even though the plain
language of the ATS created jurisdiction only, federal courts
remained empowered to accept a certain limited number of
such lawsuits pursuant to their general common law
powers. The Court explained that:
[Allthough the ATS is a jurisdictional statute creating
no new causes of action, the reasonable inference from
the historical materials is that the statute was
intended to have practical effect the moment it became
law. The jurisdictional grant is best read as having
been enacted on the understanding that the common
law would provide a cause of action for the modest
number of international law violations with a potential
for personal liability at the time.42

40
41

28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2761 (2004) (the ATS "is a

jurisdictional statute").
42 Id.
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Because it is likely that federal courts at the time the ATS
was enacted would have treated the law of nations as a
portion of the general common law, and because federal
courts at the time were generally empowered to apply
federal common law, the Court found it reasonable to allow
modern federal courts to continue to recognize such claims.
As Justice Souter, writing for the Court, expressed: "It
would take some explaining to say now that federal courts
must avert their gaze entirely from any international norm
intended to protect individuals."43
B. Keeping the Door "Ajar"
Although the Sosa Court decided to, in its words, keep the
door "ajar"" for federal courts to hear claims by aliens
alleging violations of customary international law, it
believed it was placing limitations on that power. It held
that "courts should require any claim based on the presentday law of nations to rest on a norm of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms we have recognized."45
The Court did not elaborate substantially on how to apply
this standard for recognizing CIL.46 It cited three lower
court cases that had recognized CIL causes of action that
were "specific, universal, and obligatory." 47
It also
explained in a footnote that, in appropriate cases,
international law might require plaintiffs to exhaust local

43
4

Id. at 2764-65.
Id. at 2764.

45

Id.

46

id.

at 2761-62.

See id. at 2766 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980);
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984); and In re
Estate of Marcos Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994).
47
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remedies or alternative remedies before bringing their case
to U.S. federal court.48
The Court then applied this new standard to dismiss
Alvarez-Machain's claim that "arbitrary arrest" is a
violation of CIL that is cognizable in federal courts. 49 The
Court surveyed the sources Alvarez-Machain cited as
evidence of a CIL norm against any arbitrary detentions in
excess of positive legal authority and found insufficient
support for treating such a norm as CIL. Such a norm is
largely an "aspiration" and "exceeds any binding customary
rule having the specificity we require."'°
This analysis does not necessarily clarify the Court's new
limiting standard because the lower court in the case, on
the same facts, found that Alvarez-Machain's claim that
"arbitrary detention" did constitute a violation of CIL
norms because they were "specific, universal, and
obligatory.""' Noting that leading scholars, major
international human rights instruments, and decisions by
international human rights tribunals agreed that "arbitrary
detention" was indeed a violation of CIL, the Ninth Circuit
had little difficulty holding that Alvarez-Machain had
properly stated a cause of action under CIL.5 Indeed, the
only clear difference between the analysis of the Supreme
Court and the Ninth Circuit appeared to turn entirely on
the length of Alvarez's detention. 3 While the Ninth Circuit
refused to read a "lengthy detention" requirement into the
definition of arbitrary detention, the Supreme Court held
otherwise. 4 But the basis of the Court's holding is unclear
48

See id. at 2766 n.21.

49 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769.

'0 Id. at 2769.

" Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003).
Id.; Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769.

5'

id.

Compare Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769 ("It is enough to hold that a single illegal
detention of less than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities
and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary international law so well
defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy."), with Alvarez-Machain, 331
'4
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given the substantial support from international sources
marshaled by both Alvarez-Machain and the Ninth Circuit
for its reading of the CIL norm.
In the end, application of the Supreme Court's new test
for determining CIL norms will, as Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Sosa predicts," almost certainly require
extensive lower court experimentation.
Certainly, the
actual standard, as articulated by the Court, "definable,
specific, universal, and obligatory," has been applied by
almost every lower court, including the lower court in Sosa
itself.5" While it is too early to say that the Court's new rule
will be no more restrictive than the pre-Sosa rule, it is also
far too early to say that it will operate as restrictively as
Justice Souter's opinion implies. Certainly there is no
reason to believe that any of the third wave lawsuits face
serious difficulties meeting the new test set forth by Sosa,
especially because such lawsuits generally allege violations
of CIL, such as torture, that the Court has explicitly
recognized as meeting its new test.
III.

THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND CONTROL OVER INTERNATIONAL
LAW

Sosa alludes to one potential obstacle to third wave ATS
lawsuits. In a footnote, Justice Souter suggests that the
executive branch's views on the effect of an ATS suit on
U.S. foreign policy should, in appropriate circumstances, be
given great deference." This allusion highlights one of the
least explored obstacles to successful ATS lawsuits: the use
of executive statements of interest. Because of the historic
F.3d at 622 ("We simply hold, consistent with international law, that there is no
freestanding temporal requirement nor any magical time period that triggers the
norm.").
5 Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2769-75 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56 Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d
at 621.
57 See, e.g., id. at 2761 (citingFilartiga,630 F.2d at 876).
58

Id. at 2766 n.21.
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role of the executive branch in the application of
international law-especially CIL-in domestic courts, the
coming third wave of ATS lawsuits will likely spur greater
use of this power.
A. The Source of Executive Branch Control over Customary
InternationalLaw
Historically, the executive branch always has played an
important role in the supervision of cases involving CIL in
domestic federal and state courts. While it is true that the
Supreme Court has declared (and reaffirmed in Sosa) that
customary "international law is part of our law," the Court
has also recognized that judicial interpretation of CIL is
subject to override by the executive branch in appropriate
cases.
The basis for executive branch control over CIL was not
identified by The Paquete Habana Court.59 It likely arises
from the executive's broad control over U.S. foreign policy.
This authority, which Justice Sutherland has famously
described as giving the "President alone.., the power to
speak or listen as a representative of the nation, " " is often
understood to flow from the vesting of "executive power" in
the President as well as the allocation of the treaty-making
Although no
and ambassadorial appointment powers.6
court has directly considered this question, the executive
branch has understood its power to speak and its general
discretion to conduct foreign policy to include the power to
interpret CIL on behalf of the United States. This makes
some practical sense because much of CIL has been
traditionally formed by State practice and, under the U.S.
system, the President controls most of what would
59 See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
60 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
61 For the most recent defense of the executive power theory, see Michael D.
Ramsey & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111
YALE L.J. 231 (2001).
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constitute State practice on behalf of the United States.
For example,
President Truman unilaterally, but
uncontroversially as a matter of domestic law, declared that
the United States would recognize a new rule of CIL
governing legal rights to the continental shelf abutting U.S.
territory and beyond U.S. territorial waters. 2 Such a
unilateral declaration binds the United States under
international law and probably also binds U.S. courts if the
question is ever presented to them.63 For this reason,
Professor Henkin has explained that "it is the executive
branch, far more than the courts, that acts for the United
States to help legislate customary international law."'
The President's power over CIL is not exclusive. The
Constitution allocates to Congress the power to "define and
punish...
[o]ffences against the Law of Nations." 5
Although this delegation to Congress is explicit, it has
never been interpreted to be exclusive. Rather, the power is
understood to support congressional modifications or
repeals of certain executive interpretations of CIL.66

Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the
Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg.
12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945).
63 The enforceability of the Truman Proclamation in domestic courts was
assumed and never challenged. See, e.g., Matson Nav. Co. v. United States, 141 F.
Supp. 929, 934 (Ct. Cl. 1956) (rejecting party's interpretation of Proclamation). See
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, pt. V,introductory note at
3-8 (summarizing U.S. recognition of customary law rules governing aspects of the
law of the sea) and § 102 n.2 (calling proclamation "instant customary law").
Louis Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1555, 1562 (1984).
65
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. For instance, Congress acted in 1953 to confirm the
validity of the Proclamation by legislation. Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1331 (1953). See S. REP. No. 411 of the Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., at 7 (1953). ("The committee is also of the opinion that
legislative action is necessary in order to confirm and give validity to Presidential
Proclamation 2667 of September 8, 1945....").
' Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define
and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447,
538-39 (2000) (describing executive branch's role in developing CIL).
62
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B. CIL in Domestic Courts

The status of CIL in domestic federal and state courts has
divided commentators. Traditionally, CIL was understood
to be part of the general common law that was
independently applied by both federal and state courts. 7
But commentators have debated whether CIL also forms
part of the Laws of United States under Article III or
Article VI.6 If so, CIL could serve as the basis for federal
court jurisdiction and/or preempt inconsistent state law. As
part of the laws of the United States, some have argued
that federal court interpretations of CIL could also bind the
executive branch in the same way that other federal
statutory or treaty law binds the executive branch. 9
Courts themselves have consistently treated CIL as part
of the common law and, until 1980, no court held that CIL
formed part of the laws of the United States under Articles
III and VI.7" The Supreme Court did not assert the right to
review state court interpretations of CIL due to the lack of a

67 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, pt. I, ch. 2,

introductory note at 40. For a brief discussion of dissenters to this traditional view,
see Julian G. Ku, Customary InternationalLaw in State Courts, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 1,
277 n.52 (2001).
6
The literature on this question is voluminous and can be divided into three
camps. One group holds that CIL is part of the laws of the United States under both
See, e.g., Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land:
Article III and Article VI.
Customary InternationalLaw as Federal Law after Erie, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 393
(1997). Another group holds that CIL is not federal law under either Article III or
Article VI. See, e.g., Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 822. Finally, one group
splits the difference holding the CIL is federal law for purposes of Article III but not
for Article VI. See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, InternationalLaw as Non-preemptive
FederalLaw, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 555 (2002).
69 See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, The President is Bound by International
Law, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 377 (1987).
70 The most famous case interpreting international law, The Paquete
Habana,
did not consider the status of CIL and had asserted jurisdiction in admiralty.
Another leading Supreme Court case, Banco Nationale v. Sabbatino, did not
explicitly consider the question either, although it did cite a law review article that
argued for treating CIL as federal law. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964).
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federal question. 71 But prior to that decision, courts did not
typically reach the question of whether CIL formed part of
federal or state law.
For my purposes, the key question is the relationship
between a domestic court's interpretation and application of
CIL and the views of the executive branch. It is significant
that the Court has never interpreted CIL to restrain
executive branch activity unless the executive branch
stated that it would be bound by CIL.72
The most famous example of judicial interpretation of CIL
against the U.S. government is found in The Paquete
73 where the Court held that naval officers had
Habana,
violated CIL rules prohibiting seizure of fishing vessels.
Although the naval officers lost, the Court appeared to rely
heavily on the fact that the President, through his
Secretary of the Navy, had issued an order to all naval
officers to respect the CIL of war in their conduct of
military operations. 4
The Court's view that CIL is
subordinated to executive action is further buttressed by
the statement that CIL is "part of our law" absent any
treaty, statute, or "controlling executive or legislative act."7
The best example of the way in which courts have
subordinated their interpretations of CIL to executive
authority can be found in the interaction between the
courts and the executive on the proper application of the
CIL of foreign sovereign immunity. The CIL of foreign
" On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court refused appellate jurisdiction
over state court interpretations of CIL because it believed CIL did not create a
federal question. See, e.g., N.Y. Life Ins. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875).
72 See, e.g., Authority of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Override
Customary or Other International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law
Enforcement Activities, 13 Op. Off. Legal Couns. 163, 170-71 (1989) (discussing
whether Congress and the executive can override CIL).
3 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
74 Id. at 712 (describing order of the Secretary of Navy to institute a blockade
"in
pursuance of the laws of the United States, and the law of nations applicable to such
cases").
'5 Id. at 700.
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sovereign immunity has been applied by both federal and
state courts since at least 1812 when Chief Justice
Marshall first announced the doctrine for the U.S. Supreme
Court in The Schooner Exchange v. McFadden.76 Over the
years, however, the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity has
changed from a rule of absolute immunity to a more
complex rule of restrictive immunity. While courts have
been leaders in making this change, they have always given
great deference to executive views on whether and how the
CIL of
foreign sovereign immunity applied to a particular
77
case.
Indeed, in 1945, the Supreme Court held that the
executive branch's policy toward the extension of the CIL of
foreign sovereign immunity to ships "by a foreign
government" bound the Court. 7' Thus, the government's
failure to adopt the more expansive rule of CIL was
"controlling."79 Further,
We can only conclude that it is the national policy not
to extend the immunity in the manner now suggested,
and that it is the duty of the courts, in a matter so
intimately associated with our foreign policy and which
may profoundly affect it, not to enlarge an immunity to
an extent which the government, although often asked,
has not seen fit to recognize.
The enactment of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
of 1976" did not end the role of the executive in supervising
judicial interpretation of this area of CIL. While much of
the CIL of foreign sovereign immunity was codified by
Congress, some areas, such as the rules governing head of
76

See generally The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. 116 (1812).

7 For a review of the evolution of foreign sovereign immunity doctrine in
domestic courts, see Ku, supra note 67, at 307-22.
78 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 38 (1945).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81

28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq. (2005).
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state immunity, remained part of the common law over
which the executive continued to supervise. Thus, courts
relied on executive determinations to dismiss a lawsuit
against Jean Bertrand Aristide, the then-exiled leader of
Haiti, noting that "[i]n this matter the courts are bound by
executive decision."82
Such cases demonstrate, at the very least, that the
executive branch's authority over foreign policy extends in
some instances to the interpretation of CIL by domestic
courts. As John Yoo and I have argued, these cases, along
with the general rule that the President is not bound by
CIL, mean that CIL is best understood as a species of state
common law. 3 Even if CIL is a kind of federal law, it is not
the kind of federal law for which courts have the same sort
of mandate under Article III to interpret independent of
executive branch control. At least in the context of the CIL
of foreign sovereign immunity not codified by Congress, the
President appears to hold some amount of power to
determine the rule of CIL for domestic courts, including
federal courts.
C. Sosa and the Executive Branch
Although Sosa involved a claim that U.S. officials violated
CIL, the Court did not directly consider the executive
branch's power over the interpretation of CIL. But the
Court's decision only obliquely touches on this possibility.
In a footnote, the Court acknowledges that the executive
branch's views on the effect of a particular ATS lawsuit on
foreign policy could be given "serious weight" in the
determination of whether to permit a particular ATS
82 Lafontant v. Aristide, 844 F. Supp. 128, 135 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).

In a similar

case, the Eleventh Circuit denied Manuel Noriega's claim of head of state immunity
on the grounds that this would go against the executive branch's policy of pursuing
and capturing him. United States v. Noriega, 117 F.3d 1206 (11th Cir. 1997).
83 Ku & Yoo, supra note 4, at 199-220.
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lawsuit to go forward.84 It used the example of an ATS
lawsuit against South African corporations for damages
during the apartheid era to illustrate how the executive
branch's views might require case-specific deference by the
courts .8

In re South African Apartheid Litigation" involved a
group of plaintiffs seeking damages for alleged human
rights abuses by a number of South African corporations
during the apartheid era.87 With the support of the current
South African government, the executive branch filed a
statement of interest conveying its view that permitting a
lawsuit against South African companies to continue would
interfere with the conduct of U.S. foreign policy.88 The
executive branch's statement also conveyed the views of the
government of South Africa that these lawsuits undercut
the policy embodied by the country's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, which "deliberately avoided a
'victors' justice' approach to the crimes of apartheid.... .""
Although a federal district court found this analysis
compelling enough to cite it as one basis for dismissing the
South Africa lawsuit," the broader applicability of the
Court's suggestion here is unclear. The Court couched the
rule in non-binding language, referring to "case specific
deference" with a court giving "serious weight" to executive
views. This is a far cry from earlier courts' declarations
that they were "bound by executive determinations" in the
context of foreign sovereign immunity. 91

Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2766 n.21 (2004).

85 Id.

In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 238 F. Supp. 2d 1379 (Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit.
2002).

87 id.

88 Id.
89

Sosa, 124 S. Ct. at 2765 n.21.

90 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
91 See, e.g., Republic of Mexico, 324 U.S. at 30.
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Left unanswered by the Court is what to do when the
executive branch has made a plain and unequivocal
statement of its view of whether and how a rule of CIL
should be applied. The executive branch did not make such
a statement in Sosa, and the Court did not rely on the
executive branch's views in reaching its determination that
Alvarez-Machain's claim did not rise to a level of universal
consensus to qualify as a rule of CIL (although that was in
fact the executive branch's view).
Should the executive branch attempt a more frontal
assault on the ability of the Court to independently
interpret CIL, the Court has suggested in its latest
sovereign immunity case that it will consider a rule
requiring deference to executive branch views.92
In sum, Sosa recognizes, but does not squarely address,
the scope of executive powers to bind a domestic court's
interpretation of CIL. It suggests that the Court will adopt
a rule of great deference, but it is unclear whether that
deference will rise to the level of complete submission that
characterized judicial attitudes toward the CIL of foreign
sovereign immunity. The scope of executive power to define
and to control the interpretation of CIL remains uncertain.
CONCLUSION

Sosa leaves the door ajar for a new wave of ATS lawsuits
challenging the legality of U.S. conduct of the war on
terrorism. This war, which involves a number of actions of
questionable legality under customary international law,
has already sparked a number of lawsuits challenging key
elements of the U.S. government's strategy for detaining
and interrogating suspected terrorists. Unlike previous
waves of ATS lawsuits, the third wave of ATS lawsuits will

92 See generally Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct. 2240 (2004).
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directly challenge the conduct of the U.S. government itself,
usually under customary international law.
My prediction is that the third wave of ATS lawsuits,
however meritorious, will lead defendants to test the scope
of the executive branch's power to control judicial
interpretations of CIL.
In fact, executive branch
supervision of the application of CIL by domestic federal
and state courts has a solid historical and doctrinal
pedigree. This executive power may pose the greatest
obstacle to the emerging third wave.
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